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Abstract
We revisit the well known di¤erential Cournot game with polluting emissions dating
back to Benchekroun and Long (1998), proposing a version of the model in which
environmental taxation is levied on emissions rather than the environmental damage.
This allows to attain strong time consistency under open-loop information, and yields
two main results which can be summarized as follows: (i) to attain a fully green
technology in steady state, the regulator may equivalently adopt an appropriate tax
rate (for any given number of rms) or regulate market access (for any given tax
rate); (ii) if the environmental damage depends on emissions only (i.e., not on industry
output) then the aggregate green R&D e¤ort takes an inverted-U shape, in accordance
with Aghion et al. (2005), and the industry structure maximising aggregate green
innovation also minimises individual and aggregate emissions.
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1 Introduction
If one takes a quick look at the static models dealing with emission taxation in oligopoly
(little matters whether these models include green R&D or not), it appears that usu-
ally environmental taxation is levied on per-rm emissions rather than on the resulting
(aggregate) environmental damage. The opposite instead applies instead if one exam-
ines the corresponding literature using optimal control or di¤erential game theory.1
This poses a problem of consistency between the static and the dynamic approach
to modelling the environmental impact of oligopolistic interaction on the environment
and the related design of emission taxation. Moreover, judging on the basis of casual
observation, the two approaches are not equally realistic. To begin with, although ag-
gregate data on emissions may well be more readily and easily available than individual
date at the single rm level, taxing a magnitude dened as the environmental damage
amounts to using a quite elusive concept, as the environmental damage imputable to
any single industry adds up to the cauldron of a global economic system generating
global warming and other similar e¤ects. Additionally, current rules (for instance, in
the EU) require rms to explicitly declare the CO2-equivalent emission rates of their
products (e.g., cars), making these data accessible to the public and the authorities.
In view of these considerations, here we propose a di¤erential Cournot game in
which rms are being taxed in proportion to their individual emissions and react
to the environmental tax rate by modifying output levels and investing in R&D for
green technologies. This setup allows us to obtain several results. The rst is that
- taxation being linear in each rms emission volume - the game at hand exhibits a
linear state structure and therefore yields a subgame perfect equilibrium under open-
loop information. The second result is that there exists a unique tax rate driving
to zero the volume of emissions for any number of rms, or equivalently there exists
a unique industry structure attaining the same outcome for any environmental tax
1For exhaustive surveys of both strands of research, where these features clearly emerge, see
Montero (2002b), Requate and Unold (2003), Requate (2005), Long (2010) and Lambertini (2013).
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rate. The third result is that - if the environmental damage is una¤ected by industry
output and the tax rate is optimally set - the aggregate R&D e¤ort at the steady state
equilibrium is non-monotone in the number of rms and has an inverted-U shape,
i.e., there exists a unique industry structure that maximises the collective equilibrium
investment in green technologies.2 This feature of the model has a clearcut connection
with an ongoing discussion in the theory and empirics of the economics of innovation,
which deserves to be illustrated before delving into the analysis of our specic setup.
The acquired industrial organization approach to the bearings of market power
on the size and pace of technical progress can be traced back to the indirect debate
between Schumpeter (1934, 1942) and Arrow (1962) on the so-called Schumpeterian
hypothesis, which, in a nutshell, says that one should expect to see an inverse relation-
ship between innovation and market power or market structure. Irrespective of the
nature of innovation (either for cost reductions or for the introduction of new prod-
ucts), a large theoretical literature attains either Schumpeterian or Arrovian conclusion
(for exhaustive accounts, see Tirole, 1988; and Reinganum, 1989).3 That is, partial
equilibrium theoretical IO models systematically predict a monotone relationship, in
either direction.
The picture drastically changes as soon as one takes instead the standpoint of
modern growth theory. In particular, Aghion et al. (2005) stress that empirical
evidence shows a non-monotone relationship between industry concentration (or, the
intensity of market competition) and aggregate R&D e¤orts: this takes the form of an
inverted-U curve, at odds with all existing theoretical IO models; in the same paper,
the authors provide a model yielding indeed such a concave result, and tting the
data. A thorough discussion, accompanied by an exhaustive review of the related
2The emergence of an analgous inverted-U shaped aggregate R&D curve has been illustrated by
Feichtinger et al. (2016) using a di¤erential game in which the public authority regulates price and
tunes the emission tax rate.
3See also Gilbert (2006), Vives (2008) and Schmutzler (2010) for add-ons on this discussion, where
still the Schumpeter vs Arrow argument is unresolved.
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lively debate, can be found in Aghion et al. (2013, 2015).
One could say that the inverted-U emerging from data says that Arrow is right for
small numbers, while Schumpeter is right thereafter. Alternatively, on the same basis
one could also say that neither Arrow nor Schumpeter can match reality, if our inter-
pretation of their respective views is that competition (resp., monopoly) outperforms
monopoly (resp., competition) along the R&D dimension. Be that as it may, there
arises the need of constructing models delivering a non-monotone relationship between
some form of R&D (for process, product or environmental-friendly innovations) and
the number of rms in the industry.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The setup is illustrated in
section 2. The equilibrium analysis and the main results are laid out in section 3.
Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with a population n  2 of single-product homogeneous-
good rms interacting over continuous time t 2 [0;1) : At any time t, the demand
function is p (t) = a Pni=1 qi (t) ; qi (t)  0 being the instantaneous individual output
of rm i. The demand function is based on the assumption that consumers do not
internalise any external e¤ects, i.e., consumers in this market have not developed any
environmental awareness. All rms use the same productive technology, described
by the cost function Ci (t) = cqi (t) : The production of the nal output involves an
amount of polluting emissions si (t) generated by the output of each rm i and evolving
according to the following dynamics:

si (t) =
dsi
dt
= vqi (t)  ki (t)  z
X
j 6=i
kj (t)  si (t) ; (1)
where  > 0 is a constant decay rate and coe¢ cient v  0 measures the volume of
CO2-equivalent emissions per unit of output. Variable ki (t) is the instantaneous R&D
e¤ort of rm i, and the state equation (1) accounts for the presence of spillovers in
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emission abatement, measured by parameter z 2 [0; 1] (note that if z = 1 the green
technology is a public good). The instantaneous cost associated with the R&D activity
is  i (t) = wk2i (t) ; with w > 0, and rm is emissions si (t) are taxed at the rate  > 0
at every instant.4 Hence, rm is instantaneous prots are
i (t) = [p (t)  c] qi (t)  si (t)   i (t) ; (2)
and each rm i has to set qi (t) and ki (t) so as to maximise
i =
Z 1
0
f[p (t)  c] qi (t)  si (t)   i (t)g e tdt; (3)
under the constraints posed by the state equation (1) and the initial conditions si (0) =
si0 > 0. Parameter  > 0 represents a constant discount rate common to all rms and
the policy maker.
The instantaneous social welfare function is
SW (t) =
nX
i=1
i (t) + CS (t) + 
nX
i=1
si (t) D (t) (4)
whereCS (t) = Q2 (t) =2 is consumer surplus and aggregate emissions S (t) =
Pn
i=1 si (t)
concur with aggregate output Q (t) =
Pn
i=1 qi(t) in causing the quadratic environmen-
tal damage D (t) = "Q(t) + S2 (t) ; where  and " are positive parameters.
4A tax bill dened as a linear function of polluting emissions is commonly used in static models
(see Ulph, 1996; Montero, 2002a; Chiou and Hu, 2001; and Poyago-Theotoky, 2007, inter alia). An
alternative way of modelling emission taxation consists in assuming that the tax rate is applied to
the industry-wide environmentl damage (see Karp and Livernois, 1994; Benchekroun and Long, 1998;
2002; and Dragone et al., 2014, among many others). This is, however, highly unrealistic for several
reasons. The choice we make in the present model is in line with the idea that, currently, accurate
and veriable data are indeed available at the individual rms level (e.g., this is the case in the car
industry, where the amount of carbon emissions per kilometer are declared by manufacturers on the
websites).
4
3 Equilibrium analysis
Henceforth, we will omit the time argument for simplicity, whenever possible. Since
the present game is a linear state one, the open-loop solution is subgame perfect (or
strongly time consistent) as it yields a degenerate feedback equilibrium.5 The current-
value Hamiltonian of rm i is:
Hi() = (p  c) qi   si   wk2i + ii

si +
X
j 6=i
ij

sj =
= (  Q)qi   rk2i + ii

si +
X
j 6=i
ij

sj; (5)
where   a  c > 0 denotes market size and ij(t) is the costate variable attached by
the i-th rm to the j-th state equation.
The necessary conditions (FOCs) are:
@Hi
@qi
=    2qi  Q i + vii = 0; (6)
where Q i 
P
j 6=i qj, and
@Hi
@ki
=  2wki   ii   z
X
j 6=i
ij = 0; (7)
The adjoint equations read as follows:

ii = (+ )ii +  (8)
and

ij = (+ )ij (9)
From (9) it is apparent that the solution ij = 0 for all j 6= i is admissible at all times.
This means that, at any instant t, rm i fully disregards the dynamics of any rivals
emissions.
5For more on the arising of strongly time consistent equilibria in di¤erential games solved under
open-loop information, see Fershtman (1987), Mehlmann (1988, ch. 4), Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 7)
and Cellini et al. (2005).
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Using ij = 0 and imposing symmetry on states and controls, i.e. si = sj = S,
ki = kj = k, qi = qj = q and consequently ii = jj =  for all i 6= j, we proceed to
use (7) to derive the control equation for the green R&D e¤ort k; as follows:

k =  


2w
=  (+ )+ 
2w
(10)
which, noting - again from (7) - that  =  2wk; can be rewritten as

k =
2w (+ ) k   
2w
(11)
The optimal output associated with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CN) at any time
t can instead be directly obtained by solving FOC (6):
qCN =
   2vwk
n+ 1
(12)
which obviously collapses onto the static Cournot-Nash output any green R&D e¤ort
being absent.
We may now characterise the steady state of the system. Imposing stationarity on
(11) yields
kss =

2w (+ )
(13)
where superscript ss stands for steady state. The above expression establishes our
rst result:
Lemma 1 For any given  > 0; the individual and aggregate green R&D e¤orts in
steady state are positive. Moreover, the aggregate R&D e¤ort is monotonically increas-
ing in the number of rms.
In particular, the second part of the above Lemma says that, since the aggregate
equilibrium expenditure Kss = n= [2w (+ )] is linearly increasing in the number of
rms, the present model seems to possess an Arrovian avour. We will come back to
this important aspect in the remainder.
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Now observe that the steady state individual output is
qss =
   2vwkss
n+ 1
(14)
which is lower than the static Cournot-Nash output, and strictly positive provided
that
v 2

0;
 (+ )


: (15)
Substituting (kss; qss) into the state equation (1) and imposing stationarity, we
obtain
sss = max

2vw (+ )   [2v2w + (n+ 1) (1 + z (n  1))]
2w (n+ 1) (+ )
; 0

: (16)
The following result applies:
Proposition 2 The steady state (sss; qss; kss) is a saddle point.
Proof. Given that the optimal output can be identied at any time in a quasi-static
way, the state-control system solely describes the dynamics of (sss; kss) ; and after
imposing the symmetry conditions ki = k and si = s for all i, it can be written as
follows:

s =
v (   2vwk)
n+ 1
  [1 + z (n  1)] k   s

k =
2w (+ ) k   
2w
(17)
The stability properties of the above system can be assessed via the trace and deter-
minant of the following 2 2 Jacobian matrix:
J =
2664
@

s
@s
@

s
@k
@

k
@s
@

k
@k
3775 =
24    1  2v2wn+ 1   z (n  1)
0  + 
35 (18)
The trace is T (J) =  > 0 while the determinant is  (J) =   ( + ) < 0; therefore
the steady state equilibrium is a saddle point.
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Now note that sss > 0 for all
 <  s  2vw (+ )
2v2w + (n+ 1) [1 + z (n  1)] > 0 (19)
which reveals that any tax rate at least equal to  s drives the individual and collective
volume of polluting emissions to zero in steady state, irrespective of industry structure.
Equivalently, taking  > 0 in such a way that green R&D activities do take place, one
easily veries that sss = 0 for all
n  ns  max
(
1;
  +p [ + 4z (2vw (+ )   (1 + 2v2w   z))]
2z
)
: (20)
This implies:
Lemma 3 A regulator may attain a fully green technology at the steady state in two
ways: either by xing    s for any given industry structure, or by regulating market
access in such a way that n  ns for any given tax rate  > 0.
To this regard, it is worth noting that the above Lemma (in particular if read
in terms of the industry structure driving sss to zero for any given tax rate  on
emissions), identies ns as the optimal number of rms in the commons, where the
concept of commonshas to be interpreted as the volume of polluting emissions (or the
size of the negative externality generated by them, S2) rather than, as is traditionally
the case in the extant literature dating back to Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968),
a common resource pool being overexploited. In view of this analogy, we may ask
ourselves whether an optimal number of rms can be identied in this setup, in relation
to either the minimization of the volume of polluting emissions or the maximization
of social welfare, net of the environmental damage.6
However, greenhere means sss = 0; but the overall environmental damage Dss =
"nqss is still strictly positive. Alternatively, the authority may tune  so as to minimise
6In adopting this viewpoint, we broadly follow a path opened by Cornes and Sandler (1983),
Cornes et al. (1986), Mason et al. (1988) and Mason and Polasky (1997), where the explotation of
natural resources in oligopoly is considered.
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Dss = "nqss +  (nsss)2 : The resulting tax rate is:
D 
2vw (+ )

n (n+ 1) [1 + z (n  1)]  + w (n+ 1) 2"
n [2v2w + (n+ 1) (1 + z (n  1))]  (21)
At D; we have that the overall environmental damage D is strictly positive unless
" = 0: A related - and intuitive - result can be outlined by comparing (19) and (21):
Lemma 4 D >  s for all " > 0.
That is, if industry output contributes to the environmental damage, the tax rate
minimising Dss strictly exceeds the tax rate driving steady state emissions sss to zero.
The case in which " = 0 and the environmental damage coincides with the square
of aggregate polluting emissions lends itself to the analysis of the bearings of industry
structure on the aggregate level of green R&D in steady state. If indeed " = 0; and
 =  s = D, the industry green e¤ort at equilibrium is
Kss (D)j"=0 = nkss (D)j"=0 =
vn
2v2w + (n+ 1) [1 + z (n  1)] (22)
with
@ Kss (D)j"=0
@n
=
v [1 + 2v2w   z (n2 + 1)]
[2v2w + (n+ 1) (1 + z (n  1))]2 (23)
The above expression is nil in correspondence of7
nK =
p
1 + 2v2w   z
z
 2 8 z 2

0;
1 + 2v2w
5

(24)
which implies the following:
Proposition 5 If (i) " = 0; (ii)  = D; and (iii) the spillover level characterising
rmsgreen R&D activities is su¢ ciently low, the aggregate R&D e¤ort at the steady
state equilibrium exhibits an inverted-U shape, reaching its maximum at
nK =
r
1 + 2v2w   z
z
:
7It can be easily checked that
@2 Kss (D)j"=0
@n2
< 0
at n = nK . Hence, nK indeed maximises Kss (D).
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The value of Kss (D)j"=0 in n = nK is
Kss (D; nK)j"=0 =
v
1 + 2
p
z (1 + 2v2w   z) : (25)
The above Proposition illustrates a case in which the aggregate innovation incen-
tives of an industry being subject (and reacting) to environmental regulation take the
form of an inverted-U curve with a single peak at some n > 1 (as in Aghion et al., 2005,
2013). This nding - interesting in itself as it reveals the presence of an inverted-U
shaped aggregate R&D curve - has a relevant consequence, which can be spelled out
as follows. The sign of ns   nK is the sign of8
nz  
p
z (1 + 2v2w   z) (26)
This establishes that when n = nK the expression in (26) is nil and therefore indeed
ns = nK ; which implies our nal result:
Proposition 6 If " = 0 and  =  s = D; the number of rms which drives down
to zero the volume of individual and aggregate polluting emissions coincides with the
number of rms at which the aggregate green R&D curve reaches its unique maximum.
The above Proposition can be reformulated in alternative but equivalent terms by
saying that a public authority in charge of regulating this industry faces no dilemma
or tradeo¤ between the price e¤ect and the external e¤ect when it comes to simulta-
neously tailoring the pressure of environmental taxation and market access in order to
maximise the e¤ectiveness of green R&D on one side and minimise emissions on the
other, as - provided aggregate output has no bearing on the environmental impact of
these rms - there exists a unique pair (ns = nK ; D =  s) allowing the policy maker
to get two eggs in one basket.
8To obtain (26), one has just to plug " = 0 and  = s = D in
ns =
  +p [ + 4z (2vw (+ )   (1 + 2v2w   z))]
2z
and then simplify the resulting expression for ns   nK .
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4 Concluding remarks
We have modied the dynamic Cournot game with environmental e¤ects whose rst
formulation can be found in Benchekroun and Long (1998), supposing that a public
authority adopts a linear taxation scheme by imposing an exogenous tax rate on the
individual volume of polluting emissions, rather than taxing each rm in proportion
to the environmental damage caused by aggregate emissions.
This construction ensures the presence of strong time consistency under open-
loop strategies, a feature which in itself makes the model more easily tractable. As
for the economic insight, our modelling choice delivers two main policy conclusions.
The rst is that to attain a fully green technology in steady state, the regulator is
indi¤erent between adopting an appropriate tax rate (which is uniquely dened for
any given number of rms) or regulating entry by identifying the optimal number of
rms admitted to the industry (which is also uniquely dened for any given tax rate).
The second is that, if the environmental damage depends on emissions only, then the
aggregate investment takes in green innovations exhibits an inverted-U shaped curve,
and, under the optimal tax rate, the number of rms maximising aggregate R&D
coincides with the number of rms driving to zero aggregate emissions.
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